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ABSTRACT. In 2011, significant tornado outbreaks occurred throughout the United States. The
property damage from these tornadoes was record breaking at over $28 billion. The impact of
these tornadic events on the lodging industry, however, was not as extreme and in some
instances was financially beneficial. This study evaluated the revenue implications of severe
tornado events on the lodging industry. Using data provided by the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and Smith Travel Research (STR), the lodging industries
of 17 counties impacted by either EF4 or EF5 (enhanced Fujita scale) tornadoes were analyzed.
Results indicated that the lodging operations in all 17 counties experienced an occupancy
percentage increase for multiple days after tornado events. Only five counties experienced
significant increases in average daily rate (ADR) for seven days following tornado events. All
but one county experienced increases in revenue per available room (RevPAR) following
tornado events. This suggests that gains in RevPAR were influenced more by increased
occupancy opposed to inflated room rates.
INTRODUCTION
The 2011 tornado season was one of the
most destructive and active years on record
with over 1,690 tornadoes reported (NOAA
National Climatic Data Center, 2012). In a two-
month time frame, 45 counties experienced an
extreme tornado event. Of these counties, 39
experienced an EF4 tornado with wind gusts
ranging from 166–200 mph, and six experi-
enced an EF5 tornado with wind gusts in excess
of 200 miles per hour (NOAA Storm Prediction
Center, 2011a). Interestingly, most of these
extreme tornadoes occurred within a week’s
time. The greatest number of EF4 and EF5
tornadoes occurred on April 27, 2011, when
35 counties experienced at least one tornadic
event. Less than a month later, the Jasper
County town of Joplin, Missouri, experienced
one of the most devastating tornadoes on
record. The EF5 tornado that hit this city caused
over $3 billion in damages and 158 fatalities
(NOAA National Climatic Data Center, 2011).
In total, the 2011 tornado season caused $28
billion in damages and 551 fatalities (NOAA
National Climatic Data Center, 2011). The
devastating costs and damages from these
events stunned not only those in the path of
these storms, but also those who provided basic
needs like shelter following the disasters.
The potential damage and loss caused by
tornadoes and other natural disasters is a
concern for many in the lodging industry. In
fact, companies such as Carlson, Hilton, and
Wyndham all note natural disasters as a threat
to their organization’s performance in formal
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and
threats (SWOT) analysis documents (DATA
MONITOR: Carlson Companies, Inc., 2011;
DATAMONITOR: Hilton Worldwide, 2011;
DATAMONITOR: Wyndham Worldwide Cor-
poration, 2011). These concerns have proven
true for a number of hotel companies. For
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example, in 1999, five hotel properties were
severely damaged when an F5 tornado (Fujita
scale) ripped through the Oklahoma City area
(Whitford, 1999). In 2008, both the Omni
Hotel at CNN Center and the Westin Peachtree
Plaza Hotel suffered significant property
damage as well as loss of convention business
when an EF2 tornado hit Atlanta’s business
district (USA Today, 2008). More recently, 11
hotel properties in Branson, Missouri, were
heavily damaged during the February 29, 2012,
“leap day” tornado. The largest property
impacted by this storm was the Hilton Branson
Convention Center which sustained significant
damage to 214 of its 294 rooms and over $3
million in damages to its convention center
(Fivecoat-Campbell, 2012). In total, the hotel
general manager estimated that the property
suffered $20 million in damages (Serlen, 2013).
Although a natural disaster can have
devastating consequences for a community as
a whole, the lodging industry may be able to
realize positive performance opportunities in
these situations. The type of natural disaster,
however, influences the likelihood of such
opportunities being realized. For example,
O’Neill (2005) found that Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita had negative impacts on hotel-room
demand and inventory along the Gulf Coast.
Hotels in other areas of the United States,
however, experienced positive effects and
improved value per room because they were
able to absorb the group business that Gulf
Coast hotels could no longer serve. This is not to
say that local lodging markets do not experience
positive gains from natural disasters. Hennis
(2012) notes that hurricanes tend to have
negative short-term and long-term effects on
the localized lodging segment, whereas torna-
does often “have a positive impact on the local
and regional hotel markets” (Hennis, 2012, p. 1).
The present study focuses on the localized
impact of tornadoes and seeks to contribute to
the body of knowledge in this area in two ways.
First, the study expands on similar research by
examining the revenue impact a natural
disaster other than a hurricane may have on
the lodging industry and concentrates solely on
the localized implications of such events.
Second, this research investigates the notion
of tornadoes having a positive influence on the
local hotel market by examining the events’
impacts on counties of varying populations.
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
Although severe tornado events may cause
economic loss for a community as a whole, the
lodging industry may actually see financial gains
from such events. Thus, the purpose of this
study is to evaluate the immediate revenue
impact a local lodging industry experiences
following severe EF4 and EF5 tornado events.
To better understand a tornado’s immediate
implications, three key lodging performance
indicators—occupancy percentage, average
daily rate (ADR), and revenue per available
room (RevPAR) are examined. Of particular
interest is the degree to which hotels note
revenue and performance gains and the driving
force behind these gains—increases in occu-
pancy or increases in room rates charged. The
following research questions provide the frame-
work for this study:
Research Questions
1. Are there significant differences in a
county’s occupancy percentage in the
seven days following a severe tornado
event?
2. Are there significant differences in a
county’s ADR in the seven days following
a severe tornado event?
3. Are there significant differences in a
county’s RevPAR in the seven days
following a severe tornado event?
LITERATURE REVIEW
Tornado Strength Classifications
To understand what is considered a severe
tornado event, it is important to have
fundamental knowledge of the system used to
classify tornado strength and corresponding
damage. The most widely known tornado
classification model in the United States was
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the Fujita scale or F-scale. Created and
introduced in 1971 by Dr. T. Theodore Fujita,
this scale estimated a tornado’s wind speed by
the level of damage caused (NOAA Storm
Prediction Center, 2011b). The F-scale ranged
from F0-Gale to F5-Incredible and was the
primary means of creating the database that
defined every tornado event in the United
States, including those that occurred prior to
the scale’s implementation in 1971. Infor-
mation gathered from newspaper articles and
photographs was used to classify historical
tornado events from 1950 to 1971.
Over the years, the F-scale revealed a
number of deficiencies in the classification
system. To address these deficiencies, a team
led by Texas Tech University’s Wind Science
and Engineering Research Center revised the
system and constructed the Enhanced Fujita
(EF) scale (NOAA Storm Prediction Center,
2011b). In 2007, the EF-scale was adopted and
replaced the previous F-scale (NOAA National
Climatic Data Center, 2008). Both scales use a
tornado severity rating consisting of six
numerical categories that range from 0 (the
least severe) to 5 (the most severe). The EF-
scale, however, also uses a list of 28 types of
structures and vegetation as damage indicators
to more accurately categorize a tornado’s
strength (Wind Science and Engineering
Center, 2006). Each of the 28 indicators
corresponds with varying degrees of damage.
Once a damage indicator is selected, the
estimated wind speed is determined and an EF-
scale score (EF0-EF5) is assigned. The goal is to
assign an EF-scale category based on the highest
wind speed estimated in the tornado’s path
(Wind Science and Engineering Center, 2006).
The National Weather Service (NWS) is the
only federal agency with the authority to
provide official tornado EF-scale ratings
(National Weather Service, 2008). Trained
NWS personnel identify damage indicators,
evaluate the structural or vegetative material,
and match each with one of the corresponding
degrees of damage. They then make a
judgment with regard to whether the wind
speed required to cause the damage is higher or
lower than the expected speed for the
particular degree of damage caused. This
process is completed for several structures
before a final EF rating is determined (National
Weather Service, 2008).
Natural Disaster’s Impacts on the
Hospitality Industry
Natural disasters have had an increasingly
profound effect on the hospitality industry. Hall
(2010) argues that the effects of natural disasters
on the industry are not necessarily tied to an
increase of such events but, instead, are a result
of tight linkages that exist between the global
economy, transportation systems, and com-
munication networks. These factors are now so
closely intertwined “that when one destination
or region has been affected (by a natural
disaster) . . . the impacts can reverberate
through the entire system” (Hall, 2010,
p. 401). Freed (2010) notes that the media
plays an important role in how the world views
the impact of a natural disaster. In Freed’s
discussion about the impact of the British
Petroleum oil spill in the Gulf Coast, he suggests
that the media portrayed the entire coast as
contaminated with oil, when in reality it was
not; this perceived image, however, resulted in
a decline in tourism traffic.
The impact of such disasters can be
negative for some and positive for others.
After Hurricanes Dennis, Floyd, and Irene
ravaged the East Coast, Chandler (2004)
estimated that the North Carolina lodging
industry realized room revenue losses of
$96.3 million in just a two-month period.
Conversely, Taylor (2005) suggests that Hurri-
cane Katrina produced a number of positive
effects for the lodging industry. Hotel properties
in the area that were either undamaged or able
to quickly reopen fared well after the storm,
because they were able to accommodate
Katrina emergency responders; additionally,
properties outside the damaged area were
able to absorb some of the meeting and
convention business that could no longer be
serviced by hotels and convention spaces
impacted by the storm.
A natural disaster does not necessarily
mean people will stop traveling. Instead,
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individuals may choose alternative destinations.
In 2004, a tsunami devastated the coasts of
Indonesia, Sri Lanka, South India, Thailand,
and other countries located along the Indian
Ocean coastline. Although some areas of Asia
were significantly damaged by the tsunami, it
did not prevent residents in other regions of the
affected countries from traveling. In fact, Zhang
(2005) suggests that a redistribution of out-
bound tourists occurred after the tsunami.
Chinese tourists continued to travel but
selected destinations other than the Indian
Ocean coastline. Additionally, an increase in
the price of tourist products occurred as rapid
demand for alternative travel destinations
transpired (Zhang, 2005).
In the United States, the casino town of
Tunica, Mississippi, experienced both the highs
and lows that can come with natural disasters.
Following Hurricane Katrina, the casinos and
hotels in the area realized an influx of visitors as
guests shifted their business away from the
damaged Gulf Coast casinos to establishments
in Tunica (Anderer, 2012). This shift provided
Tunica casinos the opportunity to realize record
revenues in 2007. Then, in 2011, Tunica
experienced a negative situation as the result of
a natural disaster. The flooding of the
Mississippi River diverted casino and hotel
business away from Tunica and redistributed it
to other casinos in the south. Tunica is now
struggling to regain market share, because
gamblers became accustomed to patronizing
other establishments while the town’s casinos
were closed (Anderer, 2012).
Recovery after a Natural Disaster
The ability of a business to recover from a
natural disaster’s impact is, to some extent,
determined by its strength in four areas. Zhang,
Lindell, and Prater (2009) propose four
dimensions of business vulnerability that
influence the ability of a business to recover.
These dimensions include (a) capital vulner-
ability, (b) labor vulnerability, (c) supplier
vulnerability, and (d) customer vulnerability.
Zhang et al. suggest that hospitality businesses
fare particularly well when overcoming custo-
mer vulnerability, because they are often a part
of recovery-related businesses. These types
of businesses may experience sales loss
immediately following a natural disaster but
can quickly realize demand increases as
disaster response efforts begin.
In a similar study, Sydnor-Brusso, Stafford,
Tews, and Adler (2011) suggest the presence of
three types of capital stocks—physical, human,
and social—are vital for job continuity in
communities impacted by a natural disaster.
Communities that possess higher levels of these
three capital stocks tend to be more resilient
after a natural disaster than their counterparts,
which have low levels of these capital stocks.
Sydnor-Brusso et al. (2011) found that approxi-
mately 25% of a community’s ability to
preserve the number of hotel jobs following a
natural disaster was positively explained by the
percentage of college-educated residents over
the age of 25 (human capital) and the
percentage of religious organizations (social
capital) present. This suggests that communities
with higher percentages of these two capital
stocks are more likely to retain the number of
hotel jobs after a disaster occurs. Interestingly,
this same study suggests that the resiliency of
hospitality jobs in a community is not
significantly impacted by the number of
disasters that occur or the level of damage
caused.
The human resource factor may be one of
the most critical factors in a hotel’s ability to
sustain operations following a natural disaster.
In a study of New Orleans hotel operators,
participants indicated that human resource
concerns provided the greatest number of
challenges following Hurricane Gustav
(Lamanna, Williams, & Childers, 2012). Of the
hoteliers surveyed, 42% reported that they did
not have the minimum number of employees
needed to offer full guest services after the
storm.
These natural disasters and the resulting
negative and positive consequences for the
lodging industry create a situation to consider.
The degree to which natural disasters impact a
community’s lodging sector is influenced by the
type of event that occurs as well as the
resources available to recover after an event
THE JOURNAL OF HOSPITALITY FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 7
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has occurred. To further the discussion, this
study adds to the body of natural disaster
research by focusing on the revenue impli-
cations tornadoes have on the local lodging
industry.
METHODOLOGY
Data for this study was acquired from two
different sources. The severe weather database
file provided by the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) National
Weather Service Storm Prediction Center was
used to identify counties in theUnited States that
were impacted by EF5 and EF4 tornadoes in
2011. In total that year, 45 counties were hit by
either EF5 or EF4 tornadoes (NOAA Storm
Prediction Center, 2011a). Once the impacted
countieswere identified, the Federal Information
Processing Standards codes (FIPS codes) for each
county and state were submitted to Smith Travel
Research (STR) to obtain the 2010, 2011, and
2012 daily lodging performance data of each
county. STR requires a minimum of four proper-
ties in a county to submit data before the overall
lodging performance information can be
reported. Only 17 of the 45 counties impacted
by either EF5 or EF4 tornadoes met this
requirement. Therefore, these 17 counties serve
as the focus of this study. A review of previous
research indicates that the use and matching of
the NOAA database and the STR database
differentiate this work from previous studies.
The next step in this study was to use
descriptive statistical analyses to examine the
lodging performance data of the 17 counties of
interest. First, operating ratios sevendays before,
the day of, and seven days after each 2011-
tornadoeventwereplotted. Theoperating ratios
include the daily occupancy percentages, ADRs,
and RevPARs. The two-standard deviation band
method was then performed for the counties’
occupancy percentage, ADR, and RevPAR to
detect any statistically significant differences in
the operating ratios after the tornado events.
This was accomplished by computing the
baseline mean of each ratio seven days prior to
the tornado event and then calculating two
standard deviations from the mean. Operating
ratios ofmore than two standard deviations from
the baseline mean after the tornado were
considered statistically significant (Nourbakhsh
& Ottenbacher, 1994). Operating ratio base-
lines for the corresponding time periods in 2010
and 2012 were computed in the same manner
and used for comparison.
RESULTS AND FINDINGS
Demographics
Of the 17 counties examined, six counties
had populations of fewer than 100,000, eight
counties had populations ranging between
100,000–200,000, and three counties had
populations of 300,000 or greater. The season-
ality of lodging business varied slightly among
the counties. The majority of the counties were
in the shoulder season when the tornado events
occurred. Only Dekalb County, Alabama;
Canadian County, Oklahoma; and Blount
County, Tennessee were in peak season when
impacted by the tornado events.
A review of the room-supply data before and
after the tornado event revealed that only four
counties experienced changes in supply. St. Louis
County, Missouri, experienced a one-day
decrease in room inventory after the tornado on
April 22, 2011; Hamilton County, Tennessee,
experienced a .5%decrease in room supply; and
Catoosa County, Georgia, had a 37.2% decrease
in room supply after the April 27, 2011,
tornadoes. Jefferson County, Alabama, actually
added roomsupply the sameday (April 27, 2011)
the tornado occurred there. Table 1 summarizes
the demographic data for each county.
Occupancy Percentage
Most of the counties experienced at least
one day of statistically significant occupancy
increases in the seven days following a severe
tornado (see Table 2). Chamber County,
Alabama, and Canadian County, Oklahoma,
were the only two counties that did not realize
any significant increases in occupancy after the
tornadoes. However, 12 counties experienced
5 or more days of significant occupancy
increases immediately after a severe tornado.
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Of these 12 counties, seven had significant
increases in occupancy all 7 days after the
tornadoes. These increases in occupancy
appear to be unique to 2011, because similar
trends were not found in the comparable data
for 2010 and 2012.
Average Daily Rate
Although significant occupancy increases
were seen in many of the counties examined, a
tornado event did not necessarily have the same
impact on ADR (see Table 3). Of the 17 counties
considered, seven counties did not experience
any significant increases in ADR, and three
counties had only 1 day of significant ADR
increases in the 7 days after tornadoes. Five of
the counties did see significant ADR increases
for 5 or more days after tornadoes. Tuscaloosa
County, Alabama; Jasper County, Missouri; and
Catoosa County, Georgia, had significant
increases in ADR on each of the seven days
after the tornado events. The ADR increases in
these counties were $10 to $14 above the ADR
mean for the 7 days before the tornadoes
occurred. The significant ADR increases that
occurred in 2011 seem to have been influenced
by the tornado events, because similar signifi-
cant increases in ADRs were not detected in the
2010 and 2012 comparable data.
Revenue Per Available Room
Asnoted inTable4, all counties but onehadat
least 1 day where significant RevPAR increases
were realized in the 7 days following a tornado.
Chamber County, Alabama, was the only county
not to have any significant RevPAR increases
immediately after the tornado occurred. Twelve
counties, however, did experience significant
RevPAR increases for 5 or more days after
tornadoes. Of these 12 counties, nine saw
significant increases in RevPAR for all 7 days after
tornadoes. The increases in RevPAR also seem to
be influenced by the tornado events and are
unique to 2011, because similar results were not
observed in the 2010 and 2012 comparable data.
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Although severe tornado events can have
devastating implications for the overall econ-
omic well-being of a community, the lodging
industry may, in fact, experience positive
financial benefits (Hennis, 2012). All of the
counties in this study did experienced some
level of occupancy percentage increases in the
days following severe tornado events compared
with thepreviousweek’smean.Amajority of the
counties experienced multiple days of signifi-
cant increases in occupancy. Clearly, these
occupancy increases can be a result of displaced
residents seeking aplace to stay, but they are also
influenced by members of government, private,
and volunteer agencies, who travel to these
devastated areas to provide assistance to
residents; and members of the media, who
cover the aftermath of tornadoes on site.
Although all of the counties realized some
increase in occupancy after tornado events, the
same was not true for the ADR. The majority of
the counties experienced, at most, 1 day of
significant increases in ADR. This suggests that
price gouging was either nonexistent or was
kept to a minimum in the days following the
tornadoes. The steady ADR may be influenced
by emergency service providers, such as FEMA,
who have previously negotiated contracts
specifying the maximum room rates that can
be charged, thereby reducing a hotelier’s ability
to drastically increase the rate. Additionally,
legal concerns related to price gouging may also
influence hoteliers’ willingness to significantly
increase the rates charged for rooms.
Many of the counties in this study
experienced multiple days of significant
increases in RevPAR following the tornado
events. The results of the occupancy percentage
and ADR analysis suggest that the increases in
RevPAR were driven by increases in occupancy,
opposed to inflating the rates charged for rooms.
Because price gouging in any industry is a
concern after a natural disaster, the fact that
hotels in the counties impacted by severe
tornadoes realized revenue growth through
increases in occupancy instead of ADR bodes
well for the reputation of the lodging industry.
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The financial benefits a hotel may experi-
ence following a severe tornado event are not
without challenges. EF4 and EF5 tornadoes can
cause devastating property losses as well as loss
of life. In order to make any financial gains from
a tornado, the property itself must first survive
the storm. For example, the sizeable decline in
Catoosa County’s room inventory after the
tornado suggests that property damage did
occur to some of the hotels in the area, thus
limiting the ability of the damaged properties to
experience the financial benefits after the
storm. Additionally, staffing after such an
event can be quite difficult, particularly when
employees and/or their loved ones may have
perished in the storm, which was the case for
hoteliers after the 2011 Joplin, Missouri
tornado. Employees may also have to take
time from work in order to address their own
personal property losses, which adds to staffing
challenges.
The findings of this study have implications
for both the lodging industry and investors. A
significant tornado event does not necessarily
translate into financial devastation. In fact, just
the opposite may be true. To recognize
potential revenue gains, hoteliers should work
to build relationships with government
agencies and disaster relief organizations that
provide assistance to communities impacted by
tornadoes. These two sources of business alone
can help sustain, if not improve, a hotel’s
revenue performance following a severe
weather event.
The findings may also be useful to both
investors and insurance underwriters as they
consider the risks involved with hotel properties
in tornado-prone areas. A severe tornado event
may not have the negative risk implications one
might think. The counties examined in this
study experienced minimal hotel room inven-
tory losses after extreme tornado events
occurred. Although hotels in a few counties
realized slight decreases in occupancy the day
of or day after the tornado, the decline was
relatively small. Overall, hotels in an area where
a tornado has occurred may experience an
immediate, brief, negative impact and a quick
recovery following the event.
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
To put the discussion into context, it is
important to note the limitations of this study.
First, only the lodging ratios 7 days before and
after a severe tornado event were considered in
this particular study, giving just a snapshot of the
impact of the disaster. This limits our ability to
fully understand the disaster’s long-term
economic impact on the industry. Future
research should examine changes in operating
ratios for an extended period of time in order to
gain a complete understanding of a severe
tornado’s impact and financial implications.
Second, the lodging industries in only 17 of
the 45 counties impacted by either EF4 or EF5
tornadoes in 2011 were considered in this
study. For STR to report summary lodging data
for a county, at least four properties must submit
performance information. Because 28 counties
did not report sufficient lodging data, the
generalizability of the study’s results is somewhat
limited. On the other hand, onemight argue that
if a county does not have at least four properties
which report data to STR, the lodging industry
may have little to no presence in that area.
Third, this study focuseson the roomrevenue
and performance changes that occurred in the
week following severe tornado events. In larger
hotels, multiple revenue sources, such as food
and beverage provisions, contribute to the total
revenue structure of properties. Severe weather
may result in canceled events and lost catering
revenue. Therefore, future research should
examine the impact severe tornado events
might have on revenue generated from divisions
outside of rooms.
Fourth, this study considers the lodging data
of only the counties where tornadoes actually
touched down. It does not take into account
the influence the disaster might have on the
lodging data of the surrounding counties.
Future research is needed to better understand
the economic effects a severe tornado event
may have on hotels located in counties
surrounding, because hotels fill up in the
county where the tornado occurred, and the
overflow of rooms needed may spill over into
neighboring counties.
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Finally, this study examined the lodging
industry in counties where only either EF4 or
EF5 tornadoes occurred. It does not take into
account the impact that weaker tornadoes,
such as EF1 or EF3 events, may have on the
industry. Future research is needed to under-
stand how these weaker tornado events impact
hotel-room demand and room rates charged.
The additional research may help determine if a
tornado must cause a certain level of
destruction in a county before the lodging
industry realizes upticks in its performance
data.
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